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Earmarking for global health: benefits and perils 
of the World Bank’s trust fund model
In the third article in this series, Janelle Winters and Devi Sridhar review different types of trust 
funds and how they fit within the bank’s lending mechanism, and discuss the major benefits and 
risks of the bank’s use of the trust fund model for health
Key messages
•   Trust funds (non-core voluntary aid) 
for health projects made up nearly 
half of the World Bank’s total fund-
ing for health and social services in 
2012-13
•   The Bank has four major types of 
trust funds: IBRD/IDA bank executed 
trust funds, IBRD/IDA recipient exe-
cuted trust funds, financial intermedi-
ary funds, and IFC trust funds. These 
funds have distinct purposes, imple-
mentation mechanisms, and account-
ability frameworks
•   Benefits of the trust fund system 
for health include its potential for 
enhanced flexibility, capitalising on 
international momentum, measurable 
project outcomes, and investment in 
innovative areas or financing mecha-
nisms
•   Risks of the Bank’s trust fund system 
for health include its potential for mis-
aligned aid allocation, reduced Bank 
accountability, and inadequate trans-
parency
Over the past 50 years, the World Bank 
has increasingly relied on resources con-
tributed voluntarily from donors and held 
separately from its core budget to support 
projects and activities, particularly for 
global health.1 These resources are known 
as trust funds. In the case of the bank, 
these trust funds are synonymous with 
earmarked, extra-budgetary, and “multi-
bi” aid (bilateral aid channelled through 
multilateral institutions).2 3 The absolute 
number and relative proportion of bank 
assets held in trust has skyrocketed since 
the early 1990s. In 2011, the bank was 
trustee to roughly half of the trust funds 
for official development assistance (ODA) 
worldwide,4 5 and in 2012-13 about 200 
donors contributed $3.7bn to more than 
1000 World Bank Group trust funds.6
Trust fund governance at the bank
The World Bank Group channels voluntary 
grants from donors in three major ways: 
through  IBRD  (International Bank  for 
Reconstruction and Development) and IDA 
(International Development Association) 
trust funds, financial intermediary funds, 
and IFC (International Finance Corpora-
tion) trust funds. In this article we focus 
primarily on the World Bank’s IBRD and 
IDA trust funds and financial intermediary 
funds (table 1, see the first paper of this 
series for more on the World Bank Group’s 
structure).7 At IBRD/IDA, trust funds are 
classified as bank or recipient executed, 
depending on the bank’s management 
role. Bank executed trust funds are imple-
mented directly by the bank.8 9 They typi-
cally fund technical support for IBRD/IDA 
country projects, provide seed funding for 
pilot projects, or contribute to the bank’s 
knowledge agenda. For recipient executed 
trust funds, the bank hands over imple-
mentation of the project to a third party, 
such as a country’s Ministry of Health or a 
non-governmental organisation.4 5 8 9 These 
trust funds generally co-finance IBRD/IDA 
lending operations, finance stand alone 
projects, or support debt servicing opera-
tions.8 9 Some recipient and bank executed 
trust funds share governance structures 
called “facilities,”4 10 which are designed 
to increase coordination. To reduce frag-
mentation and better recover costs from 
managing IBRD/IDA trust funds, the bank 
recently announced a policy to replace 
recipient executed trust funds with “hybrid 
funds,” which will have bank executed 
components.11
Financial  intermediary  funds  are 
more  flexible and complex  financing 
mechanisms that—with rare exception—
support global or regional partnerships. 
For  this  type of  trust  fund,  the bank 
negotiates a customised agreement with 
implementing agencies, which generally 
makes the bank trustee of funds from 
multiple  donors.4  9  12  In  some  cases, 
the bank’s role is restricted to holding, 
receiving, and transferring commitments 
on  behalf   of   legally   independent 
implementing agencies (for example, the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria), while in others the bank 
is both trustee of and major donor to the 
fund (for example, the African Programme 
for Onchocerciasis Control). Finally, IFC 
trust funds typically finance advisory 
services to businesses and governments, 
as part of its institutional mandate to 
promote private  sector  investment  in 
developing countries. An example is the 
$1bn Health in Africa Initiative, which 
is designed to channel funds for private 
health facilities and healthcare delivery 
and has received donor support through 
small  trust  funds and a  large private 
equity fund.13 14
Collectively, trust funds allow the bank 
to increase its income and role in global 
activities. At the end of 2016, the bank 
served as steward to about $11bn in trust 
fund resources at  IBRD,  IDA, and IFC, 
and held $23bn in financial intermediary 
funds.15  These  resources  finance  a 
considerable proportion of the bank’s staff 
and operations, including over 60% of all 
global partnerships and nearly two thirds of 
the bank’s advisory and analytics work.15 16 
In 2013, trust fund revenue was almost as 
substantial as that of the entire IDA.16
Trust funds for health: a 2012-13 snapshot
How much of this trust fund portfolio is 
dedicated  to health projects? Accord-
ing to statistics reported by the bank in 
2013, about half of the cumulative com-
mitments to financial intermediary funds 
to date was for the health sector (fig 1). 
In 2012-13 alone, cash contributions to 
financial intermediary funds for the health 
sector totalled around $3.9bn, or 37% of 
the total cash contributions to bank trust 
funds.9 The same year, recipient executed 
trust  funds handed out about $430m 
to the health and social services sector, 
which represents around 4% of the total 
disbursements from bank trust funds (fig 
2).9 17 Data are not available on bank exe-
cuted trust fund financing for the health 
sector, but their relative contribution to 
the health sector is small as bank executed 
trust funds for all sectors accounted for 
just 6% of all trust fund disbursements in 
2012-13.9 To put these numbers in per-
spective, IBRD/IDA lending for core health 
and social services projects was just over 
$5bn in 2012-13.18
Benefits of the trust fund model for health
What has driven the bank to increasingly 
turn to trust funds to finance health pro-
jects? Firstly, the flexibility of trust funds 
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allows the bank to raise funds from a 
diverse group of donors for priority coun-
tries, while retaining the bank’s trusted 
financial management services.6 16 17 Core 
IBRD/IDA programmes can accept contri-
butions only from governments, but trust 
funds can accept funding from the private 
sector. This is especially important for 
vertical (disease specific) funds: corpora-
tions like Exxon Mobil and pharmaceuti-
cal companies have contributed to health 
trust  funds, and the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation was the second largest 
donor to the recent replenishment of Gavi, 
the Vaccine Alliance.6 19 New financing 
mechanisms for many vertical funds also 
entice donors by allowing them to make 
programme and budgetary decisions. The 
Global Fund and Gavi, for example, have 
their own legal charters and a board of 
directors on which for-profit private sec-
tor representatives have voting power.20 
Finally, trust funds can channel funding 
to countries that are not members of the 
bank or do not choose to invest in global 
public goods.6 For instance, the Avian and 
Human Influenza Facility raised $126m 
for  avian  influenza  surveillance  and 
control in 2006-13 and allocated some 
of this funding to “weak link” countries 
that were not prioritising influenza control 
interventions.21
Secondly,   rapid  agreement  and 
disbursement of funds allows trust funds 
to channel the requests of specific donors 
in the context of specific international 
events  or  initiatives.5  6  Donors  have 
explained that they earmark aid because 
it allows them to respond more quickly 
to emerging challenges.6 Most trust funds 
are able to disburse funds more rapidly22 
than core IBRD/IDA funding mechanisms 
because they sidestep traditional bank 
administrative and operational processes. 
For  example,  unlike  in  core  lending, 
the bank’s board of executive directors 
usually are not required to approve trust 
fund proposals.23 Such ability to harness 
political momentum has been crucial to 
start up many global health programmes 
targeting infectious diseases.4 19 20
Thirdly, the narrowly defined goals and 
measurability of outcomes of trust funded 
projects make them attractive to donors.6 
Trust funds for communicable disease 
control have increasingly dominated the 
bank’s trust fund portfolio over the past 
15 years (figs 1 and 2).5 12 Some private 
donors to these funds—particularly the 
Gates Foundation—have strong preferences 
for financing technological and disease 
specific interventions.24 25 The outcomes 
of these grants are usually measured by 
simple metrics, like the number of bed 
nets, vaccines, or drug tablets distributed 
in specific countries.26 27 Furthermore, 
because public and private donors  to 
trust  funds are  often able  to  earmark 
their commitments to specific regions or 
activities, they are able to trace what their 
aid is buying at the country level.6
Finally, trust funds permit the bank and 
donors to support innovative regional and 
global projects that do not fit with the IBRD/
IDA country focused allocation system. 
The bank has highlighted how trust funds 
allow it to expand its global partnerships 
Table 1 | Categories of World Bank trust funds and their general characteristics
General purpose Bank role Donors
Geographical 
focus Accountability Fees
IBRD/
IDA Bank 
Executed Trust 
Fund (BETF)
Project analytical and 
advisory services; project 
administration; bank’s 
knowledge agenda
Implementation. 
Funds support bank’s 
work programme
Single donor 
(majority); 
multi-donor
Country projects 
(majority)
Subject to bank administrative (not 
operational) policies; bank prepares 
terms of reference, procures goods/
services, makes payments, and 
submits financial and programme 
reports to donors
Indirect rate of 17% of personnel 
costs charged on disbursement
IBRD/IDA 
Recipient 
Executed Trust 
Fund (RETF)
Co-financing IBRD/IDA 
operations; financing 
technical assistance
Operational. Funds 
pass to third party 
for implementation; 
bank appraises or 
supervises funded 
activities
Single donor 
(majority); 
multi-donor
Country projects 
(majority)
Subject to bank operational policies; 
recipients (implementers) submit 
progress and audited finance reports 
to bank. Some RETFs (>$5m or 
co-financing) can instead follow only 
administrative policies
For new “hybrid” funds, indirect rate 
of 17% for BETF portion charged on 
disbursement; scaled fees for RETF 
portion charged at contribution: 5% 
fee on first $50m, 4% fee on next 
$450m, 3% fee on next $500m, 
2% fee on further contributions
Financial 
intermediary 
fund (FIF)
Providing complex 
trustee services for funds 
transferred to multiple 
implementing agencies
Financial trustee. 
Customised 
administrative, 
financial, or 
operational services
Multi-
donor (vast 
majority)
Regional and global 
programmes (vast 
majority)
Case by case operational, 
administrative, and financial policies. 
Standard bank policies do not apply
Case by case. Cost recovery policy 
generally applies
Global Fund to ght AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria
(Global Fund), established 2002
Non-health FIF
International Finance Facility for
Immunisation (IFFIm)/GAVI Fund ($2750m),
established 2006
Advance Market Commitment ($652m),
established 2009
African Programme for Onchocerciasis Control II
(APOC-II) ($157m), established 2001
$26 026m$31 184m
Fig 1 | As of June 2013, the health sector represented 48.7% of active financial intermediary 
fund (FIF) cumulative funding. Based on data from World Bank annual trust fund report (2013)
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data from World Bank annual trust fund report 
(2013)
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for  global  public  goods,  emergency 
response, novel focuses (like gender), and, 
crucially, the control of communicable 
diseases.4101215 Several health trust funds 
have also allowed the bank to fundraise 
in new ways or  to pilot new financing 
mechanisms. For instance, the bank has 
used trust funds to incentivise IDA loans 
for maternal and child health (see paper 
4 of this series on the Global Financing 
Facility28), to encourage donors to buy 
down IDA loans for countries investing in 
polio control,2930 and to provide Wall Street 
based  insurance against  future global 
pandemics (see paper 5 of this series on the 
Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility31). 
Similarly, trust funds supporting health 
results based financing have enabled the 
bank to pilot performance based financing 
at a village level before deciding whether to 
apply this strategy nationwide.4
Risks of the trust fund model for health
Several costs, however, emerge from pur-
suing this model of investment. One major 
concern is that the bank has become vul-
nerable to “Trojan multilateralism” or 
the increased influence of small groups 
of donors on its health programming.2232 
Indeed, major donors have reported that 
trust funds are a mechanism for bypassing 
existing allocation systems and influenc-
ing the bank’s priorities.6 This could tilt 
health funding toward vertical interven-
tions and away from health priorities in 
the recipient country.223334 For instance, 
the bank’s Independent Evaluation Group 
found that the polio buy down programme 
focused exclusively on providing polio 
vaccines and not wider health or social 
services infrastructure4 and that delivery 
of vertical funds sometimes overburdened 
weak national health systems.16 Addition-
ally, two key measures that allow IDA to 
provide performance based allocation for 
its core projects—the country policy and 
institutional assessment and worldwide 
governance indicators—do not apply to 
trust funds, which further raises the risk 
that trust funds might not fit the needs of 
low income countries.34
A second risk is that trust funds erode 
capacity of core health, nutrition, and 
population staff and weaken accountability 
mechanisms  at  the bank. While  trust 
funds do not tend to increase the total 
amount of funding that sovereign donors 
give to the bank, their separate approval 
and allocation processes might increase 
transaction costs for the bank and recipient 
countries.216 This can erode capacity of 
bank  staff  to  supervise other  country 
based health projects16 and explains why 
the bank recently began to charge higher, 
Examples RecommendationsProblem
Information on 
current bank 
trust fund 
policies and 
governance 
structures is out 
of date and 
intermittently 
available
Trust fund 
annual reports 
and directories 
contain 
incomplete 
identifying and 
nancial 
information
The major bank 
nancial 
datasets are 
missing 
numerous trust 
funds and are 
oen not 
user-friendly
External 
development 
assistance for 
health nancial 
datasets must be 
used to study 
bank health 
funding with 
caution as they 
exclude many 
bank trust funds
• The bank’s operational manual (14.40) does not clearly state which types 
of trust funds are covered by its policy
• Trust fund information is scattered across the bank’s website, and many 
links on the bank’s Development Finance (DFi) department’s vice 
presidential unit website, which is responsible for the trust funds and 
partnership department, are broken or have not been updated since 2013 
(as of 1 June 2017)
• It is unclear precisely which environmental and social safeguards 
dierent trust funds must conform to
• The trust fund directory was last updated in 2012 and includes only trust 
funds that were active in 2009-12
• The last trust fund annual report was released in 2013
• Trust fund annual reports do not typically include comprehensive lists of 
trust funds, and only sometimes break apart funds by sector (for instance, 
health)
• Many trust funds are listed by trust fund number in World Bank Finances 
datasets, but trust fund numbers are listed neither in the directory nor 
annual reports, and many trust funds have no websites
• The World Bank Finances web portal’s dataset for nancial intermediary 
funds includes only health funds related to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance and 
the Global Fund
• The World Bank Finances dataset on IFC/IBRD/IDA trust funds is 
extremely poorly organised. Many trust funds are missing names or trust 
fund numbers, there is no sector classication, it is unclear which funds 
are recipient or bank executed, and it is unclear which projects many trust 
funds support. Some datasets were last updated in 2013
• The nancial intermediary fund trustee website contains only active 
funds and has no archive of recently ended trust fund websites
• AidFlows—the beneciary view includes only bank executed trust funds 
and the co-nancing portion of IBRD/IDA lending; it has no IFC information, 
or information on recipient executed trust funds and nancial intermediary 
funds. It also includes data only from nancial year 2011-15. The donor 
view oen gives only trust fund numbers, with no names or other 
information. Both views were last updated in 2016
• The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) dataset on 
development assistance for health does not include most trust funds for 
health at the bank. It includes Gavi and the Global Fund nancial 
intermediary funds but not most IBRD/IDA trust funds, other nancial 
intermediary trust funds, or IFC trust funds
• The OECD Development Assistance Committee’s Creditor Reporting 
System (OECD-DAC) relies on donors to report their contributions to trust 
funds and is missing many contributions to bank trust funds. For an 
example, see the graph in the appendix
The DFi website should include (or a portal should be created to include):
• Document(s) on the current governance and provision of trust funds at 
the bank (including which units manage dierent types of trust funds, 
and contact information)
• Up to date operational and administrative manuals, and clear 
indications of which trust funds they apply to
• Dated les that announce new trust fund policies like cost recovery
• A current, searchable trust fund directory and complete archive of trust 
fund reports (see below)
• Links to active trust funded programme web pages, and archived pages 
for former programmes
• Clear guidance, with supporting documentation, of the up to date 
safeguards that apply to each type of trust fund (and explicit policies for 
customised agreements of nancial intermediary funds)
• A single searchable directory should be created that includes:
  • A list of previous and current trust funds, with dates of initiation and
  closure, programme name, trust fund number, and sector
  • More detailed information about currently operating trust funds (like in
  the outdated 2012 version)
• This task might be best accomplished by creating a searchable portal, 
similar to the World Bank Projects portal that contains nancial and 
non-nancial information about all past and present core bank projects
trust fund annual reports should be released yearly, and should 
consistently have:
  • Cash contributions and disbursements for each active trust fund
  • A breakdown of trust funds by type (recipient executed, IFC, etc)
  • A breakdown of trust funds by sector (health, infrastructure, etc)
• The World Bank Finances datasets should be made more user friendly
by including:
  • Full trust fund names, numbers, abbreviated programme descriptions,
  classications (recipient executed, IFC, etc), and sector
  • All trust funds from the advertised period (about 1990 to present)
  • A regular schedule for being updated
  • A category, like in the OECD datasets, for gender or human rights. This
  would allow researchers to better track how trust funds are contributing
  to cross-cutting health issues
• The Financial Intermediary Fund Trustee website should contain links to 
archived webpages for programmes, like the African Programme for 
Onchocerciasis Control, which recently ended
Many of these issues fall outside of the purview of bank control and will 
be assisted if the bank releases improved data through its nancial 
datasets. The bank can help by updating AidFlows more oen and 
comprehensively. For the time being, researchers should use IHME and 
OECD DAC-CRS to track total bank health expenditures judiciously
Fig 3 | Transparency issues and recommendations for bank health trust funds (IBRD/IDA and financial intermediary funds) 
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more consistent fees for trust funds.1735 The 
bank’s cost recovery framework (charging 
higher/consistent fees for trust funds) was 
initiated to prevent capacity erosion—if it 
charges consistent overhead costs for each 
trust fund, it can use this income to hire 
more staff or pay HNP staff directly for their 
work on trust funds.
There is an especially high risk that 
trust  funds that  finance global health 
partnership  programmes  will   lack 
oversight and accountability. The bank 
does not have a central unit to oversee 
its participation in global partnerships,16 
and the financial intermediary funds that 
typically  fund  these partnerships are 
not covered under the bank’s standard 
fiduciary, operational, or administrative 
policies.36  Environmental  controls, 
overhead fees, and the public’s access 
to information on financial intermediary 
funds (FIFs) are therefore variable and 
not guaranteed.4 10 37 38 Bank executed 
trust funds also came under fire in 2015, 
when it was made clear that they do not 
fall under  the mandate of  the bank’s 
inspection panel—the body that countries 
can turn to if they feel that safeguards have 
been compromised by a bank project.39 40
Finally, the bank’s recent claim that 
it is a “champion for transparency and 
accountability”15 in its use of trust funds 
contrasts with the reality of trust fund data 
and operations. The bank emphasises 
its  efforts  to  “reform  the  trust  funds 
framework” by “defining mobilisation 
objectives more strategically, simplifying 
and harmonizing agreements, improving 
cost recovery, and incorporating these 
funds more  fully  into  the  budgetary 
allocation process.”41  It  points  to  the 
availability of financial and non-financial 
information about trust funds through 
AidFlows,  the Financial  Intermediary 
Fund Trustee website, and the World Bank 
Finances platform.4 15 These resources, 
however,  have  major  transparency 
problems for members of the public and 
researchers  (fig 3).  Figure 3  suggests 
specific ways in which these problems 
could be dealt with.
For a summary and in depth illustration 
of these drivers and potential perils of the 
bank’s health trust funds, see the case 
study of onchocerciasis programmes—
funded by the oldest and longest running 
trust funds at the bank—in the appendix.
Conclusion
The health financing landscape has trans-
formed over the past 30 years as private aid 
flows increasingly overtake official devel-
opment assistance.42 43 With this shift, the 
supremacy of IBRD’s non-concessional 
financing model has ended, and IDA, IFC, 
and trust fund commitments now dwarf 
its own.6 At the same time, the bank has 
transformed from a country based lender 
to a development organisation with repre-
sentation on the most global partnership 
programmes in the world.16
Trust funds reflect the World Bank’s 
eagerness to capitalise on these private 
aid flows for global health activities. This 
business decision largely explains the 
proliferation of ad hoc administrative and 
operational policies for IBRD/IDA trust 
funds and financial intermediary funds. 
Competitive interests of private investors 
to IFC also explain its restrictive access 
to information policy44 and customised 
policies about safeguards. In our view, 
however, trust funds have operated largely 
in the shadows and beyond the purview of 
members of the public, without having to 
conform to the measures taken to increase 
monitoring  and accountability  in  the 
bank’s core work. We call on the bank to 
commit to its “Forward Look” strategy41 for 
a stronger World Bank Group by improving 
its trust fund transparency (fig 3 gives 
explicit recommendations) as a first step.
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